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Abstract—This paper presents a random coding scheme with
which two nodes can exchange information with guaranteed
integrity over a two-way Byzantine relay. This coding scheme
is employed to obtain an inner bound on the capacity region
with guaranteed information integrity. No pre-shared secret or
secret transmission is needed for the proposed scheme. Hence
the inner bound obtained is generally larger than those achieved
based on secret transmission schemes. This approach advocates
the separation of supporting information integrity and secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order for two parties to communicate through an in-
termediary node, it is required that the intermediary (hereto
referred to as a relay) must faithfully forward the information.
In a communication network, such cooperative behavior is
not guaranteed as relays may have reasons for forwarding
false information in order to fool the intended participants.
Such attacks, oft referred to as Byzantine attacks, have major
ramifications on protocols that operate within the network. For
instance, Maurer [1] addressed the need for authentication in
order to support secret key agreement in a simple two-node
system with an active eavesdropper. In much the same way,
integrity of information must be guaranteed for larger systems
to ensure secrecy. The genesis of this problem has roots in
cryptography [2] where codes like [3], [4] have been studied as
a means of determining Byzantine attacks, while more recent
work has focused on the integrity of a network using linear
network coding [5], [6], as well as the study of using coding to
determine manipulation in basic channels which are supported
by a relay [7], [8].
Historically this problem of guaranteeing information in-
tegrity is treated by the use of a non-observable key to add
redundancy to information that allows attack detection. In [3],
the problem, originally motivated by a dishonest gambling
pit boss, was studied with use of planar codes and random
codes. While in [4], Cramer et al. show that any random
linear transformation into a space of greater dimension is with
high probability invertible. Thus if one were to modify the
transformation or the symbols, it is with high probability that
the modified sequence would not be one corresponding to
any valid input sequence. The resulting codes are known as
algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes.
In order to extend these ideas to the physical layer, addi-
tional redundancy is required to cope with the possibility of
channel errors. Mao and Wu [8] posed the problem of trying
to determine which relay in a multiple relay two-hop network
was manipulating the data. A cross-layer method is set forth in
which a cryptographic key is inserted into the signal, by which
the intended destination determines from the physical layer
error rate if manipulation has occurred. In slight contrast, the
more recent work of He and Yener [7], mainly focused on the
problem in the two-way two-hop channel studied in this paper,
does not require use of a shared secret key. Instead, an LDPC
code is employed to support secret transmission which in turns
allows the use of an AMD code to detect attacks by the relay
key. The major drawback of this solution is not separating the
need for secrecy and integrity. As a result, it does not provide
a deeper understanding of what is actually needed to support
the two different requirements, making extensions to beyond
the addition channel considered in [7] difficult.
In contrast we propose a different strategy by separating the
concepts of secrecy and integrity to ensure that communication
can be verified without use of any key or any secret transmis-
sion. Using random coding techniques, we obtain an inner
bound on the capacity region with guaranteed information
integrity in the general scenario of two nodes which must
communicate through a Byzantine relay node. Section II
describes the channel model in detail. The inner bound on
the capacity region with guaranteed information integrity is
provided in Section III. An outline of the achievability proof
that leads to the inner bound is given in Section IV. The
notation employed in the paper is summarized in Table I.
II. TWO-WAY AMPLIFY-AND-FORWARD RELAY MODEL
Consider the two-way, half-duplex relay channel model
shown in Fig. 1, in which two nodes (1 and 2) simultaneously
send symbols to a relay node through a discrete, memoryless
multiple-access channel (MAC). The half-duplex relay node
is then supposed to broadcast its received symbols back to
the two nodes in the amplify-and-forward (AF) manner. For
simplicity, we assume that the broadcast channel (BC) from
the relay back to the nodes is perfect. That is, both nodes
perfectly observe the symbols sent out by the relay. There
is some possibility that the relay may modify its received
symbols in an attempt to conduct a manipulation attack. The
design goal is for each node to at least detect any malicious act
of the relay in the event that it can not decode the information
sent by the other node; in other word, to guarantee the integrity
of the information forwarded by the relay.
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(b) Broadcast channel
Fig. 1: Two-way, half-duplex, amplify-and-forward relay
model.
TABLE I: Notation
X random variable
x ∈ X the element x from the alphabet of X
xn n instances of random variable X over X
N(x|xn) number of times x occurs in xn
Pxn (x)
1
n
N(x|xn)
Pxn|yn (x|y) Pxn,yn (x,y)Pyn (y)
[X]nδ
{
Pxn : |Pxn (x)− P (x)| ≤ δ
}
Tn
[X]δ
{xn : Pxn ∈ [X]nδ }
PX|Y (x|y) cond. pmf of X given Y ; also treated as a matrix
1 (·) indicator function
More specifically, let X1, X2, and U denote the discrete
alphabets of node 1’s input, node 2’s input, and the output of
the MAC. Over time instants 1, 2, . . . , n, suppose that nodes 1
and 2 transmit the symbol sequences xn1 and x
n
2 , respectively,
through the memoryless MAC. The output sequence Un is
conditionally distributed according to
p(un|xn1 , xn2 ) =
n∏
i=1
PU |X1,X2(ui|x1,i, x2,i) (1)
where the conditional pmf PU |X1,X2(u|x1, x2) specifies the
MAC. The relay node, during time instants 1, 2, . . . , n, ob-
serves the output symbol sequence Un of the MAC, processes
(or manipulates) it, and then broadcasts the processed symbol
sequence to nodes 1 and 2 at time instants n+1, n+2, . . . , 2n
via the perfect BC. Let V be the alphabet of the relay’s
processed symbols. Because the relay is supposed to work in
the AF manner, there must be a one-to-one correspondence
between the elements of U and V . Thus, without loss of
generality, we may assume that V = U . Let V n denote
the relay’s output sequence. The assumption of perfect BC
from the relay to the nodes implies that Y1 = Y2 = U ,
PY1|V = PY2|V = I , and
p(yn1 , y
n
2 |vn) = 1 (yn1 = yn2 = vn) . (2)
For convenience hereafter, we simply make V n the symbol
sequence observed by both nodes.
Fix n. Let R1 and R2 be two positive rates. Consider the
encoder-decoder quadruple (Cn1 ,C
n
2 , g
n
1 , g
n
2 ):
Cn1 : {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} → Xn1
Cn2 : {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2} → Xn2
gn1 : Un × {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} → {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2} ∪ {!}
gn2 : Un × {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2} → {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} ∪ {!}
where Cn1 and g
n
1 are the encoder and decoder used by node 1,
and Cn2 and g
n
2 are the encoder and decoder used by node 2.
Note that we allow the encoders Cn1 and C
n
2 to be random. The
symbol ! in the decoder output alphabets denotes the decision
that the received sequence is deemed untrustworthy, i.e., the
relay has possibly been malicious. Let W1 and W2 be indepen-
dent messages of nodes 1 and 2 that are uniformly distributed
over {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} and {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2}, respectively. Then
Xn1 = C
n
1 (W1) and X
n
2 = C
n
2 (W2) are the codewords sent
by nodes 1 and 2 to the relay through the MAC.
The potential manipulation by the relay is specified by the
conditional distribution of V n given the other random quan-
tities mentioned above. We impose the Markovity restriction
on the conditional distribution that
p(vn|un, xn1 , xn2 , w1, w2, cn1 , cn2 ) = p(vn|un, cn1 , cn2 ) (3)
which means that the relay may potentially manipulate the
transmission based only on the output symbols of the MAC
that it observes as well as its knowledge about the codebooks
used by the nodes. If p(vn|un, cn1 , cn2 ) = 1 (vn = un), then
we regard the relay as non-malicious. Otherwise the relay is
malicious. For later presentation clarity, we will employ H1
and H0 to denote the conditions that the relay is and is not
malicious, respectively.
With the scheduling and coding scheme described above, we
say that the rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable with guaranteed
information integrity if there exists a sequence of encoder-
decoder quadruples {(Cn1 ,Cn2 , gn1 , gn2 )} such that:
Under H0 :
Pr {gn1 (V n,W1) 6= W2 ∪ gn2 (V n,W2) 6= W1} → 0
Under H1 :
Pr {gn1 (V n,W1) /∈ {W2, !} ∪ gn2 (V n,W2) /∈ {W1, !}} → 0
as n → ∞. Note that the requirement under H1 forces
the decoders to either detect the substitution attack by the
relay or correct the symbols modified. The capacity region
with guaranteed information integrity in this case can then
be defined as the closure of the set of achievable rate pairs
with guaranteed information integrity. Note that we have not
counted the use of the perfect BC from the relay back to the
nodes in the rate definition above. If that is to be counted, the
factor of 0.5 should be added to all rates because the fixed
transmission schedule descrived above.
Note that from (1), (2), and (3), the joint distribution of
3(V n, Un, Xn1 , X
n
2 ,W1,W2,C
n
1 ,C
n
2 ) is given by
p(vn, un, xn1 , x
n
2 , w1, w2, c
n
1 , c
n
2 )
= p(vn|un, cn1 , cn2 ) p(un|xn1 , xn2 ) 1 (cn1 (w1) = xn1 )
· 1 (cn2 (w2) = xn2 ) p(w1) p(w2) p(cn1 , cn2 ). (4)
III. INNER BOUND ON CAPACITY REGION
Under the operational definition of information transfer with
guaranteed integrity given in Section II, it turns out that
the matrix-algebraic structure of manipulability given in [9]
is critical to our inner bound on the capacity region. For
easy reference, we repeat the definition of manipulability for
node 1’s observation channel specified by the stochastic matrix
pair (PU |X1 , PY1|V ) in the notation of this paper:
Definition 1. The observation channel (PU |X1 , PY1|V ) is
manipulable if there exists a |U| × |U| non-zero matrix Υ,
whose jth column, for each j = 1, 2, . . . , |U|, is balanced
and (0, 0)-polarized at j, with the property that all columns
of ΥPU |X1 are in the right null space of PY1|V . Otherwise,
(PU |X1 , PY1|V ) is said to be non-manipulable.
Manipulability of node 2’s observation channel
(PU |X2 , PY2|V ) is the same.
Theorem 1. An inner bound on the capacity region with
guaranteed information integrity is the closure of the convex
hull of all (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 < I(X1;U |X2)
R2 < I(X2;U |X1)
for some
PU,X1,X2(u, x1, x2) = PU |X1,X2(u|x1, x2)PX1(x1)PX2(x2)
having the property that (PU |X1 , I) and (PU |X2 , I) are both
non-manipulable.
Note that the difference between the above region and the
standard capacity region (without guaranteed integrity) is that
the former does not contain the rate pairs generated by input
distributions that do not give non-manipulable observation
channels while the latter does.
Let us apply Theorem 1 to the simple example two-way AF
relay channel made up of a binary erasure MAC [10] and a
perfect BC. That is, X1 and X2 have the same binary alphabet
{0, 1}. The MAC is described by U = X1 + X2. Hence the
alphabet of U and V are both {0, 1, 2}. The BC is defined
by Y1 = V and Y2 = V , and PY1|V = PY2|V = I . Let
PX1(1) = p and PX1(1) = q, where 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1. Then
PU |X1 =
1− q 0q 1− q
0 q
 and PU |X2 =
1− p 0p 1− p
0 p
 .
It is not hard to check [9, Thm. 2] that both (PU |X1 , I) and
(PU |X2 , I) are non-manipulable for all choices of p and q.
Thus the inner bound in Theorem 1 implies that the capacity
regions with and without guaranteed information integrity are
identical as shown by the thick-lined square region in Fig. 2,
and can be achieved by choosing both X1 and X2 to be equally
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Fig. 2: Capacity region with guaranteed information integrity
of the two-way AF relay channel with a binary erasure MAC
and a perfect BC.
likely binary random variables. With this choice of input
distributions, the shaded area shown in Fig. 2 is the capacity
region of the binary erasure MAC channel, treating the relay
as the MAC receiver. From the achievability argument in
Section IV, to guarantee integrity while operating in the shaded
region, we need randomization in the encoders to move the
operating point up to the unshaded triangular portion of the
capacity region. Physically, this means that we need to confuse
the relay from decoding both nodes’ messages. Note that for
this two-way relay channel, uncoded transmission can achieve
capacity without guaranteed information integrity, while coded
transmission is needed in order to achieve capacity with
guaranteed information integrity. We point out that this two-
way relay channel is also considered in [7], our result shows
that attack detection can be indeed achieved without secrecy.
IV. OUTLINE OF ACHIEVABILITY
We employ the standard random coding argument to show
that the probabilities of both error events under H0 and
H1 employed in the definition of achievable rate pairs in
Section II, averaged over all random codebooks, converge to
zero as n increases under the conditions stated in Theorem 1.
Then the existence of a codebook pair (and the corresponding
decoding functions) having the same property is guaranteed.
A. Code Construction
Fix PX1(x1) and PX2(x2) that satisfy the condition
of non-manipulable (PU |X1 , I) and (PU |X2 , I). It can
then be shown that I(X1;U) < I(X1;U |X2) and
I(X2;U) < I(X2;U |X1). If I(X1;U) < R1 <
I(X1;U |X2), I(X2;U) < R2 < I(X2;U |X1), and R1 +
R2 > I(X1, X2;U), independently and uniformly pick
2nR1 codewords Cn1 (1),C
n
1 (2), . . . ,C
n
1 (2
nR1) from the typ-
ical set Tn[X1]δn
, where {δn} satisfies the delta conven-
tion set forth in [11]. Similarly, pick 2nR2 codewords
Cn2 (1),C
n
2 (2), . . . ,C
n
2 (2
nR2) from the typical set Tn[X2]δn
.
Instantiations of Cn1 and C
n
2 define the deterministic encoding
functions for nodes 1 and 2, respectively. If (R1, R2) does not
satisfy the above conditions, choose another pair (R′1, R
′
2),
with R′1 ≥ R1 and R′2 ≥ R2, that does. Randomly pick 2nR
′
1
4and 2nR
′
2 codewords from Tn[X1]δn
and Tn[X2]δn
as above to
form codebooks for nodes 1 and 2, respectively. Pick inde-
pendent (of all other random quantities) random numbers W ′1
uniformly from {1, 2, . . . , 2n(R′1−R1)} and W ′2 uniformly from
{1, 2, . . . , 2n(R′2−R2)}. Then employ the random encoding
function which maps W1 to Cn1
(
(W1 − 1)2n(R′1−R1) +W ′1
)
,
and the random encoding function which maps W2 to
Cn2
(
(W2 − 1)2n(R′2−R2) +W ′2
)
. Clearly if we can decode
to (W1 − 1)2n(R′1−R1) + W ′1, we can also obtain W1, and
if we can decode to (W2 − 1)2n(R′2−R2) + W ′2, we can also
obtain W2. Therefore, we may simply assume below (R1, R2)
satisfy I(X1;U) < R1 < I(X1;U |X2), I(X2;U) < R2 <
I(X2;U |X1), and R1 +R2 > I(X1, X2;U), and employ the
deterministic encoders without loss of any generality.
For a fixed codebook pair (cn1 , c
n
2 ), nodes 1 employs (and
symmetrically for node 2) the following typicality decoder:
gn1 (v
n, w1) =

w2 if (vn, cn1 (w1), c
n
2 (w2)) ∈ Tn[U,X1,X2]2µn
and there is no wˆ2 6= w2 such that
(vn, cn1 (w1), c
n
2 (wˆ2)) ∈ Tn[U,X1,X2]2νn ,
! otherwise,
where µn is a function of δn and the alphabets U , X1, and X2,
and νn ≥ µn will be specified later. Both µn and νn satisfy
the delta convention. Below we will also make use of µ′n, µ
′′
n,
µ˜n, and µˆn, which are all constant multiples of µn.
B. Error analysis under H0
Under this case, we have V n = Un. Because of
symmetry and the union bound, it suffices to consider
Pr {gn1 (V n,W1) 6= W2}. To that end, define
U(xn1 , xn2 ) ,
{
un : (un, xn1 , x
n
2 ) ∈ Tn[U,X1,X2]2µn
}
,
Vβ(xn1 ;w2, cn2 ) ,un : ⋃
wˆ2 6=w2
(un, xn1 , c
n
2 (wˆ2)) ∩ Tn[U,X1,X2]β 6= ∅
 ,
respectively. Then
Pr {gn1 (Un,W1) 6= W2} ≤ Pr{Un /∈ U(Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2))}
+ Pr
{
Un ∈ U(Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2))
∩ V2νn(Cn1 (W1);W2,Cn2 )
}
. (5)
It remains to show that both probabilities on the right hand
side of (5) converge to zero as n→∞.
By the combination of [11, Problem 2.9], (1), and [11,
Lemma 2.12], it is shown that
Pr{Un /∈ U(Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2))}
≤ (n+ 1)2|X1||X2| 2−nδn + 2|U||X1||X2| e−2nδ2n . (6)
Additionally, using the standard argument (cf. [10, Ch. 7]),
based on the fact that the codewords in the codebooks are
chosen independently, it is easy to establish
Pr{Un ∈ U(Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2)) ∩ V2νn(Cn1 (W1);W2,Cn2 )}
≤ 2−n[I(X2;U |X1)−R2−n],
for some n → 0.
C. Error analysis under H1
Again by symmetry and the union bound, it suffices to show
that Pr {gn1 (V n,W1) /∈ {W2, !}} vanishes as n increases. Al-
lowing λn to be set later, define
E1 = {(un, vn) : min I
(
X˜1; V˜ |U˜
)
> λn}
E2 = {(un, vn) : min I
(
X˜1; V˜ |U˜
)
≤ λn}
where for each pair of (un, vn), the minimization of mutual
information above is over all triples (X˜1, U˜ , V˜ ) of random
variables, which respectively take values over X1, U , and U ,
and have distributions satisfying the following constraints:
PU˜V˜ (u, v) = Punvn(u, v)∣∣∣PX˜1|U˜ (x1|u)− PX1|U (x1|u)∣∣∣ ≤ µ˜n∣∣∣PX˜1|V˜ (x1|v)− PX1|U (x1|v)∣∣∣ ≤ µ˜n. (7)
Note that for (un, vn) ∈ E2, min I(X˜; V˜ |U˜) ≤ λn. To
simplify notation, let (X˜, U˜ , V˜ ) be the choice that achieves the
minimum. Then by the Pinsker inequality [10, Lemma 11.6.1],
there exists a constant k such that∣∣∣PV˜ |U˜ (v|u)− PV˜ |U˜,X˜1(v|u, x1)∣∣∣ ≤ k√λn.
This inequality itself also implies that there exists another
constant k′ such that∣∣∣∣∣∑
u
PV˜ |U˜ (v|u)PU |X1(u|x1)− PU |X1(v|x1)
∣∣∣∣∣ < k′√λn.
This situation though is analyzed in [9], and can be
shown to imply that there exists another scalar k′′
giving
∣∣∣PV˜ |U˜ (v|u)− 1 (v = u)∣∣∣ ≤ k′′√ε, provided that
(PU |X1 , I) is non-manipulable. Consequently, it can
be shown that (vn, cn1 (w1), c
n
2 (w2)) ∈ Tn[U,X1,X2]2k˜√λn
if un ∈ U(cn1 (w1), cn2 (w2)), for some constant k˜.
By setting, νn = k˜
√
λn, we can conclude that
{Un ∈ U(Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2)), (Un, V n) ∈ E2} is not
an error event under H1. Therefore we can bound
Pr {gn1 (V n,W1) /∈ {W2, !}} as below:
Pr {gn1 (V n,W1) /∈ {W2, !}}
≤ Pr{Un /∈ U (Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2))}
+ Pr{Un ∈ U (Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2)) ,
V n ∈ V2µn(Cn1 (W1);W2,Cn2 ), (Un, V n) ∈ E1} (8)
The probability Pr{Un /∈ U (Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2))} has been
shown to vanish above (cf. (6)). It thus remains to show that
the second probability on the right hand side of (8) decreases
to zero as n→∞.
5To that end, define the following sets for convenience:
Q1(un, vn; cn1 )
,
{
w1 : c
n
1 (w1) ∈ Tn[X1|U ]µ˜n (u
n)
⋂
Tn[X1|U ]µ˜n (v
n)
}
,
Q2(un, vn; cn1 , cn2 )
,
w2 : cn2 (w2) ∈ ⋃
w1∈Q1(un,vn;cn1 )
Tn[X2|U,X1]µ′′n
(un, cn1 (w1))
 ,
Q3(w2;un; cn1 , cn2 )
,
{
w1 : c
n
1 (w1) ∈ Tn[X1|U,X2]µ′n (u
n, cn2 (w2))
}
.
By [11, Problem 2.10], there exists ζn satisfying the delta
convention that∣∣∣Tn[X1|U ]µ˜n (un) ∩ Tn[X1|U ]µ˜n (vn)∣∣∣ ≤ 2n[maxH(X˜1|U˜,V˜ )+ζn],
where X˜1, U˜ , V˜ are restricted to distributions that satisfy (7).
Through judicious use of this and [11, p. 409, Lemma 17.9],
the following bounds can be shown:
Pr
{
|Q1(un, vn;Cn1 )| > γ2n
[|R1−min I(X˜1;U˜,V˜ )|++ζn+n]}
≤ e−σ(γ)2n[|R1−min I(X˜1;V˜ |U˜)|
++ζn+n]
,
Pr
{
|Q2(un, vn;Cn1 ,Cn2 )| >
γ2
n
[∣∣∣R2−I(X2;U |X1)+|R1−min I(X˜1;U˜,V˜ )|+∣∣∣++ζn+3n]
,
|Q1(un, vn;Cn1 )| ≤ γ2n
[|R1−min I(X˜1;U˜,V˜ )|++ζn+n]}
≤ e−σ(γ)2
n
[|R2−I(X2;U|X1)+|R1−min I(X˜1;U˜,V˜ )|+|++ζn+3n]
,
Pr
{
max
w2
|Q3(w2;un;Cn1 ,Cn2 )| > γ22nn
}
≤ e−σ(γ)22nn+nR2 ln 2,
for any γ > 1 and σ(γ) , γ ln γ − γ + 1. Hence all the three
probabilities above can be bounded by the double exponential
term e−σ(γ)2
n′n for some ′n with the property that n
′
n →∞.
Using this and (4), we can bound
Pr
{
Un ∈ U (Cn1 (W1),Cn2 (W2)) ,
V n ∈ V2µn(Cn1 (W1);W2,Cn2 ), (Un, V n) ∈ E1
}
≤ 2−n[H(U |X1X2)+R1+R2−n]
∑
un,vn
1 ((un, vn) ∈ E1)
· 1
(
un ∈ Tn[U ]µˆn
)
1
(
vn ∈ Tn[U ]µˆn
) ∑
cn1 ,c
n
2
p(vn|un, cn1 , cn2 )
· |Q2(un, vn; cn1 , cn2 )| ·max
w2
|Q3(w2;un; cn1 , cn2 )| p(cn1 , cn2 )
≤ 2−n[H(U |X1X2)+R1+R2−n]
{
2n[2H(U)+2n] · 3e−σ(γ)2n
′
n
+
∑
un,vn,cn1 ,c
n
2
1
(
un ∈ Tn[U ]µˆn
)
1 ((un, vn) ∈ E1)
· γ22n
[∣∣∣R2−I(X2;U |X1)+|R1−min I(X˜1;U˜,V˜ )|+∣∣∣++ζn+5n]
· p(vn|un, cn1 , cn2 ) p(cn1 , cn2 )
}
≤ 3e−σ(γ)2n
′
n+n[H(U)+I(X1,X2;U)−R1−R2+3n] ln 2
+ γ22−n[R1+R2−I(X1,X2;U)−ζn−7n] + γ22−n[λn−ζn−8n].
Hence by setting λn = 2ζn + 8n, the upper bound vanishes.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented an inner bound on the capacity region of
which two nodes can exchange information with guaranteed
integrity through a two-way Byzantine relay. The inner bound
is specified by the non-manipulability property of the channel.
The coding scheme that achieves the bound requires neither
any pre-shared secret nor secret transmission. As a result, the
inner bound is generally larger than any achievable region
that is obtained based on secret transmission. We believe
that the inner bound is in fact the capacity region with
guaranteed information integrity. We will prove this converse
statement in an upcoming paper. Finally we point out that the
coding scheme described can be easily modified to support the
additional requirement of secret transmission.
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